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ABSTRACT 
 
CHERYL DONG: Black Power GIs: How the Rising Storm of Radical Black Masculinity in 
the Vietnam War Shaped Military Perceptions of African-American Soldiers 
(Under the Direction of Jerma Jackson) 
 
During the Vietnam War, a new generation of African-American men entered the military.  
These young soldiers grew up in the crucible of the Civil Rights Movement and brought new 
expectations of racial equality to the military.  At the same time, an escalating war in 
Vietnam and the racial inequity of the draft caused many soldiers to turn to radical 
expressions of black masculinity.  These demonstrations of radical black masculinity 
renegotiated meanings of citizenship and military service for young, African-American men.  
These soldiers questioned the traditional narrative that military service could serve as a path 
to American citizenship and even questioned the value of American citizenship itself.  These 
soldiers explored alternatives to American citizenship through experimentation with black 
nationalism and black power.  After the Vietnam War, the military had to re-think the 
relationship of military service to American citizenship itself.  In a nation without the draft, 
military service could no longer be the ultimate test of masculine citizenship.  Instead, the 
military had to re-package itself as economic opportunity instead of patriotic duty. 
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Introduction 
 
On December 23, 1967, Marine Terry Whitmore lay in a hospital bed in the combat 
ward of Da Nang military base, Cam Ranh Bay.  Compared to many men on the ward, 
Whitmore was lucky.  He was not missing any limbs and although his legs had been riddled 
with bullets, he had suffered no permanent damage and was likely to walk again.  Despite the 
pall of death and suffering that usually permeated the walls, on this particular Saturday, the 
air was filled with a sense of anticipation and excitement.  President Lyndon B. Johnson was 
coming to personally tour the ward and award medals to all the wounded men.  Like the other 
men, Whitmore was excited about the impending visit of the distinguished guest.  Yet as a 
proud Marine, he struggled to hide his excitement under a suitably stoic expression. When 
Lyndon B. Johnson walked up to his bed, Whitmore did the Marines proud by exclaiming 
that he was feeling fine and ready to return to combat.1  Once the President had moved on to 
the next bed, a man approached Whitmore to ask if he belonged to the 101st Airborne.  
Somewhat heatedly, Whitmore shot back, “Hundred and first?  Man, I’m in One-one.  First 
Marine, First Division.  I ain’t in no motherfuckin’ army.  I’m a U.S. Marine!”  The man 
abruptly walked off as the soldier in the next bed leaned over to Whitmore and exclaimed, 
“Man, do you know who that was?” That man, of course, was General Westmoreland, the 
overall commander for the entire ground war in Vietnam and an Army man.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Terry Whitmore, Memphis Nam Sweden: The Story of a Black Deserter.  (New York: Doubleday & Co., 
1971), 86. 
 
2 Whitmore, Memphis Nam Sweden, 88. 
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Just three short months later, Whitmore took the first fateful steps to becoming a war 
deserter and an anti-war activist.3 On his decision to desert, Whitmore cited many of the 
same reasons militant African-American soldiers, serving in Vietnam, used to describe their 
discontent with military service:  the military was a discriminatory organization that put the 
burden of the war unevenly on black men; the Vietnam War was an imperialist venture that 
asked African Americans to kill other colored men; the real war was not in Vietnam but in 
the civil rights struggle on the home front.4  The expression of these militant attitudes, 
although seemingly uncharacteristic for Whitmore, was part of a larger transformation in the 
attitudes of African-American soldiers.  Whitmore had joined the Marines in the fall of 1966 
as a young high school graduate because there were few job opportunities for a young black 
man in his hometown of Memphis.  He also wanted to escape the vicious cycle of poverty 
that held his parents and the African-American community in its thrall.  In seeking out the 
Marines, Whitmore consciously expressed admiration for the masculine ideals of hard work, 
patriotism, and social uplift that are associated with the Marine Corps and singled out the 
Marine Corps from all the other military service branches for its martial and masculine 
prowess.5 Meeting LBJ in person and being recognized for his bravery in combat, Whitmore 
had seemingly achieved the Marine masculine ideal. Whitmore’s transformation from proud 
Marine to disgruntled war deserter is indicative of a larger shift in the attitudes of African-
American soldiers during the Vietnam War.  How did African-American soldiers like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Whitmore, Memphis Nam Sweden, 108. 
 
4 Whitmore, Memphis Nam Sweden, 119-120.  These same reasons for discontent are cited in many oral 
histories and other memoirs, as well as monographs on African-Americans’ military service in the Vietnam 
War.  See for example:  Terry Wallace, Bloods: an Oral History of the Vietnam War, (New York: Random 
House, 1984) for a good sampling of oral histories.  Also, Herman Graham III, The Brothers’ Vietnam War: 
Black Power, Manhood, and the Military Experience, (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 2003). 
 
5 Whitmore, Memphis Nam Sweden, 38. 
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Whitmore come to disassociate military service as a path towards civil rights and instead 
embrace a militant attitude against the military? 
During the Vietnam War (1965-1973), African-American soldiers underwent a 
fraught transformation.  Initially, these men approached the military as an oasis where they 
could enjoy the rights of citizenship and respectability denied to them in American society.  
As the war progressed, African-American soldiers began to see the military as categorically 
at odds with their racial identity. This change stemmed from a broader demographic shift 
underway within the military.  Older, career-oriented soldiers had dominated the Armed 
Services.6  By 1968, these career-oriented soldiers had been largely replaced by draftees on 
the front lines of the war and in Vietnam.  The demographic shift assumed added meaning 
for African-American soldiers because the younger generation of draftees had grown up in 
the crucible of the civil rights movement.7 
These African-American draftees challenged the very formulation of black military 
masculinity that had inspired generations of African-American soldiers into military service.  
Black military masculinity, which acknowledged that African-American men were politically 
and economically disenfranchised in American society, supplied a path out of discrimination 
in both symbolic and material ways.  Donning the uniform of military service, African-
American soldiers could claim the identity of the citizen soldier serving to protect American 
democracy abroad and at home despite their political disenfranchisment.8  In addition, the 
secluded life of regular soldiers on military bases offered a chance for African-American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Michael S. Foley, Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War, (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 39-40. 
 
7 Kimberley L. Phillips, War! What is it Good For?, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2012), 225. 
 
8 Adriane Lentz-Smith, Freedom Struggles: African-Americans and World War I, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 37-38. 
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soldiers to assume a form of middle-class respectability by achieving the male breadwinner 
ideal for themselves and their families.  After the desegregation of the Army in 1948, 
military bases became integrated spaces where African-American soldiers could in theory 
interact on an equal basis with white soldiers.9  In addition, lower prices on food and other 
family necessities at the post exchange as well as military housing allowed African-American 
soldiers to maintain a fairly middle-class standard of living. In essence, black military 
masculinity made men and citizens out of African Americans who were otherwise 
emasculated by the strictures of Jim Crow and white supremacy.10 
However, the rise of a nascent civil rights movement in the early 1960s and popular 
anti-Vietnam War sentiment in the late 1960s inspired a sharp critique of the state as the 
ultimate enablers of Jim Crow that challenged this traditional alliance between African 
Americans and the military.11  In the crucible of the Vietnam War, soldiers applied the 
radical civil rights movement to their own circumstances.  For many, the military became the 
proxy for the state and the target for African-American soldiers’ militant criticisms.  
Ultimately, black radical masculinity fueled a racial crisis that blossomed during the last 
years of the Vietnam War.  Its enduring legacy shattered the very assumptions of black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The nature of military bases offering some protection to African-American soldiers has a long history dating 
back at least to World War I.  Adriane Lentz-Smith argues that during World War I, the seclusion of African-
American soldiers on the Houston military base angered local whites, who were unable to maintain Jim Crow 
modes of behavior for these interlopers.  Lentz-Smith, Freedom Struggles, 60.  For a more relevant argument to 
the experience of African-American soldiers on American bases in the early 1960s, right before the Vietnam 
War, see Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesar’s Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2005), 70-71. 
 
10 Steve Estes.  I AM A MAN!  Race, Manhood, and the Civil Rights Movement.  (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 2005). 
 
11 The positioning of the state as the enemy was the underlying assumption of many black nationalist and black 
power organizations.  See the Panthers’ Ten Point Program.  Huey Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2005), 123-124. 
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military masculinity by naming the military and the state as subjugators rather than allies in 
the civil rights struggle. 
For the military establishment, the rise of radical black masculinity challenged all of 
its previously held assumptions about African-American soldiers’ supposed loyalty to the 
military.  Since the onset of desegregation in 1948, the military presented itself as more 
progressive in civil rights than civilian society in general.12  Yet, as the first test of combat in 
a fully desegregated Army, the Vietnam War provoked widespread discontent. In the 
aftermath of the war, the military struggled to forge a new alliance with African-American 
soldiers and understand the roots of African-American dissent in the Civil Rights Movement.  
In the process a different understanding of military masculinity coalesced that was informed 
by the radical black masculinity of the Vietnam War.  The new military masculinity stressed 
individual social mobility and the professionalization of the military.  Values of citizenship 
and loyalty were overshadowed by emphasis on the material benefits of military service like 
a professional career.13  This new military masculinity coupled with the All-Volunteer Force 
became the military’s response to racial discontent. 
In the past fifty years, scholarship on the Vietnam War has largely fallen into two 
categories, policy history and the experiential history of soldiers in the Vietnam War.14  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Although Harry S. Truman ordered the Army to desegregate immediately in 1948 through executive Order 
9981, the US Army did not officially complete desegregation until 1954, after the end of the Korean War.  See 
MacGregor, Morris J. Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965.  (Washington, DC:  Center of Military 
History United States Army, 1985), 473. 
 
13 Bailey, Beth L.  America’s Army:  Making the All-Volunteer Force.  (Cambridge, Mass:  Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 80-83. 
 
14 For monographs that mainly focus on policy and general histories of the Vietnam War from the American and 
Vietnamese point of view, see ed. David L. Anderson, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 2011). Robert K. Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy:  the NLF’s foreign relations and 
the Viet Nam War, (Lawrence, University of Kansas, 2006). Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory:  Measuring 
US Army effectiveness and progress in the Vietnam War, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2011). Jeffrey 
J. Clarke,  United States Army in Vietnam.  Advice and Support:  The Final Years, 1965-1973, (Washington, 
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Historians who work in policy history have thoroughly traced the strategic failures of the 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, 
and the Pentagon in fighting the Vietnam War.  These policy histories place the blame for 
America’s failure thoroughly on the policy decisions of upper level strategists who failed to 
understand counterinsurgency.  However, these historians have overlooked the effects on 
personnel discontent on American military failures in Vietnam.  In contrast, those historians 
who work on the experiences of Vietnam-era veterans have fought hard to de-bunk the myth 
that Vietnam-era soldiers were war criminals, drug addicts, and mentally disturbed 
psychiatric patients unable to integrate into the civilian world or hold a normal job.15  As a 
result, this scholarship has emphasized overall loyalty and bravery of Vietnam-era soldiers 
despite the mistakes of policy makers in laying out a concrete military strategy in Vietnam.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 1988). Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake:  the Vietnamese and 
the Americans in Vietnam, (Boston:  Little Brown, 1972).  David Hackworth, About Face, (New York:  Simon 
and Schuster, 1989). James P. Harrison, The Endless War: Vietnam’s struggle for Independence, (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1989). George C.  Herring, America’s Longest War:  the United States and 
Vietnam, 1950-1975, (New York:  McGraw-Hill, 1996). George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: a different kind 
of war, (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 1994). Frederik Logevall, Choosing War: the Lost Chance for 
Peace and the Escalation of war in Vietnam, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). H.R. McMaster, 
Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to 
Vietnam, (New York:  Harper Collins, 1997). Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990.  (New York:  
Harper Collins, 1991). 
 
15 For examples of this scholarship, see Christian G. Appy, Patriots:  The Vietnam War Remembered from All 
Sides, (New York:  Viking, 2003). Kyle Longley, Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam, (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008). Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, 
and Vietnam, (Lawrence, the University Press of Kansas).  B.G. Burkett, Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam 
Generation was Robbed of its Heroes and its History, (Dallas, Verity Press, 1998).  Also, Joanna Bourke, An 
Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-century Warfare, (New York: Basic Books, 
1999).  This is more a history of looking at how combat soldiers are conditioned to kill.   
 
16 Cotright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance during the Vietnam War, 2005. For examples of scholarship on 
African-American soldiers’ military experience in Vietnam see Herman Graham III, The Brother’s Vietnam 
War.  I AM A MAN!  Race, Manhood, and the Civil Rights Movement.  (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 2005).  James E. Westheider, The African-American Experience in Vietnam: Brothers in Arms, 
(Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).  Wallace Terry, Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War, 
(New York: Random House, 1984).  These works address the symptoms of discontent, but do not address the 
process of militant identity formation among African-American soldiers.  In addition, these works do not 
address the impact of discontent for the military. 
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In the process, these scholars have minimized the extent of dissent in the military and largely 
ignored the racial discord that defined African-American soldiers’ experiences, especially in 
the later years of the war. 
This thesis analyzes the experiences of militant African-American soldiers during the 
Vietnam War as they created new understandings of radical black masculinity that put them 
in direct opposition with military policy.   By exploring both the impact of failed military 
policy on African-American soldiers and how the new masculinity forced the military to 
renegotiate their own understanding of black military masculinity, this thesis bridges the gap 
between experiential history and policy history and shows how the two are inextricably 
intertwined rather than discrete, separate spheres of influence. 
Radical black masculinity, which coalesced gradually, can be divided into two 
distinct phases of development.  In the first phase, which spanned the period between 1965 
and 1967, frustration with failed military policy in Vietnam generated rumblings of 
discontent among African-American soldiers.  This frustration trickled back to the African-
American civilian communities through returning veterans and the radical black press where 
an emerging radical civil rights movement lent a militant edge to African-American critiques 
of the Vietnam War.   The gathering storm of black discontent turned into explicit 
articulations of dissent in the second phase.  The critical turning point came in 1968 and 1969 
with the assassination of Martin Luther King and the rise of the Black Panther Party.  
Together these developments pushed many African-American soldiers into direct opposition 
to the military and created a counterculture of radical black masculinity heavily influenced 
by black power ideology. 
Section 1: The Rumblings of Discontent 1965-1967 
	   	   	  	  
8	  
In July of 1965, President Johnson agreed to commit 500,000 troops to fight in 
Vietnam, thus marking the beginning of American involvement in a ground war that would 
provoke deep divisions and debates in the United States.17  Ostensibly fighting against an 
aggressive, communist invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, American troops 
actually faced a popular insurgency that they were not prepared to fight.  In addition, 
President Johnson, the erstwhile commander of the war from 1965 to 1968, was more 
concerned with domestic policies at home than winning the war.18  His involvement in 
Vietnam stemmed more from his desire to be seen as hard on communism than from any will 
to seriously commit his administration to the war.  Thus, from the very beginning, the 
Johnson Administration set no consistent policy other than crisis management and 
minimization of the impact of the Vietnam War on civilian society.  Johnson’s lack of 
commitment ultimately hampered the military plans of General Westmoreland and the 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and created deep divisions between the 
Johnson Administration and top officials in the Pentagon during the first crucial years of the 
war (1965-1967).19 
 For the soldiers who served on the ground in the early years, these upper level 
rumblings seemed far away even though they would later have a serious impact on morale.  
These foot soldiers were Army and Marine regulars who for the most part had volunteered 
for service and saw themselves as a professional force. In 1965, only 28 percent of Army 
casualties were draftees.20  Moreover, soldiers in 1965 were deployed as whole units, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War, 140-141. 
 
18 George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 19. 
 
19 Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 34. 
 
20 George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993),171. 
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creating a sense of unity and purpose.  These soldiers had pride in both the Army and Marine 
Corps as a whole and in their individual units.  Many of the officers and enlisted soldiers 
believed the United States to be the greatest military power in the world.  However, as 
soldiers became wounded or died, their replacements were sent as individuals rather than as 
whole companies, thus breaking the carefully constructed unit morale that the Army and 
Marine Corps had cultivated in the early years of the war.21  In addition, high casualties 
coupled with a seeming lack of a coherent military strategy caused soldiers to question why 
they were fighting in Vietnam at all. 
African-American soldiers who served in the early part of the war largely adhered to 
a traditional model of military masculinity.  They had joined the military because they had 
bought into military advertising promising citizenship and middle-class respectability to the 
African-American soldier and because of high unemployment among African-American men 
in the early 1960s.  As historians Donna Murch and Heather Thompson argue, despite 
general prosperity in the early and mid 1960s, African-Americans in rural and urban areas 
suffered from both the industrialization of agriculture and the de-industrialization of urban 
areas like Oakland, California, the later home of the Black Panther Party.22  More 
economically vulnerable than working-class whites, poor African Americans were the more 
likely to feel the effects of early de-industrialization and the transition to a service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Longley, Grunts, 76-78. 
 
22 Donna Jean Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in 
Oakland, California, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 38-39.  Heather Ann Thompson, 
“Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar America,” The Journal 
of American History 97.3 (2010): 717-718. 
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economy.23 The promise of good pay and the ability to provide for one’s family lured a 
myriad number of African Americans to enlist. 
 Among the African-American men to join the military in the early 1960s for 
economic reasons was Bobby Seale, later Black Panther founder and radical. As Seale came 
of age, he reflected on the limited opportunities that had stymied his father’s life and had 
turned his father into a disillusioned, violent man. Eager for something better, Seale enlisted 
in the Air Force where he hoped to secure job skills and an education that would help him 
break the cycle of racial poverty playing out within his own family.24 Seale was soon kicked 
out of the Air Force for discipline problems.  However, most young, African-American men 
who joined the military in the early years joined for similar reasons and served out their 
terms successfully.  Albert French, an enlisted Army man who joined the military in early 
summer 1965, laid out the reasons for joining, “It’s better than the streets.  Half the dudes in 
jail already, ain’t a job nowhere, mills ain’t doing shit.”25 
 Intangible reasons, like the desire to prove one’s manhood, inspired many young 
African Americans to join the military as well.  Young African-American men felt 
emasculated in a society that denied them rights as citizens and largely condemned them to a 
life of poverty.  Some turned to military service because it offered opportunities largely 
unavailable in civilian society.  In the military, African-American soldiers could achieve 
middle-class respectability for their families by acting out the role of the primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Graham III, The Brothers’ Vietnam War, 14. 
 
24 Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: the story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton.  (New york: Random 
House, 1970), 6-7. 
 
25 Albert French, Patches of Fire, 6-7. 
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breadwinner and patriarch.26  In addition, African-American soldiers felt that military service 
was an essential proving ground of black masculinity.  Through heroism on the battlefield, 
African-American soldiers could disprove the stereotype that they were cowardly or that they 
did not belong in the proud, American military tradition.27  These reasons were reflected in 
the personal accounts of African-American soldiers who fought in the early years of the 
Vietnam War. 
 Jerond Belton, who enlisted in October of 1965, could have easily avoided military 
service by taking a music scholarship to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical 
University.  However, Belton decided to reject the scholarship in favor of volunteering 
because he wanted to see the world.  Reflecting on his decision, Belton remarked, “I didn’t 
know I would see it [the world] in a big mushroom [cloud] like the way it happened.”  Partly 
to justify his desire for adventurism, Belton went on to say that after military service, he did 
use the G.I. bill to go to college.28  For young African-American men like Belton, military 
service offered the promise of “having it all,” a promising career, a college education, and the 
fulfillment of adolescent adventurism.  One young black Marine, who was later radicalized 
by his experience in the Marine Corps, related how his desire to be seen as masculine drove 
his decision to enlist, “I passed this recruiting station, and saw in the window a sign that said, 
‘JOIN THE ARMY AND BE A MAN.’  For some goddamned reason I believed that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The dream of middle class respectability can be seen in Colin Powell’s memoir.  Colin Powell, My American 
Journey, (New York: Random House, 2005), 72-73.  However, as a newlywed, he would be unable to find 
middle-class housing when he moved to Fort Bragg, NC with his wife. 
 
27 Phillips, War! What is it Good For?, 207. 
 
28 Jerond L. Belton, interview by author, digital recording, Durham, N.C., 26 March 2012. 
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U.S.M.C. made a man out of anybody.  And I wanted to be a MAN more than anything in 
this goddamned world.”29 
 The military service branches understood African-American soldiers’ desires to 
achieve the military masculine ideal and they used masculinity to create unit cohesion and 
pride in basic training.  Army and Marine drill sergeants derided all races equally and used 
derisive language to refer to recruits in order to bond soldiers to each other against a mutual 
antagonist, the drill instructor.30 Terry Whitmore described the use of language as a 
particularly effective tool in basic training.  By the end of basic training, the soldiers had 
gotten accustomed to calling each other hogs.  When during one roll call, a soldier referred to 
the men as hogs, the drill sergeant quickly corrected him and exclaimed, “What did you say, 
Marine?  I see seventy-eight Marines in front of me.  I have no hogs in my platoon.”  The 
pride that swelled in Whitmore’s chest as he heard his old antagonist, the drill sergeant, 
praise the platoon made him for that one moment a proud Marine.31 
The psychological effect of basic training to bond soldiers together affected even 
unwilling draftees as well.  David Parks, drafted in late 1965 and took basic training in 
January of 1966, described how the bullying tactics of his drill sergeant forced all the 
disparate soldiers in his platoon to bond together.  “The fellows in my platoon are becoming 
nicer guys…Maybe it’s because they are making a team of us, getting us to realize we will 
have to depend upon one another in combat,” he wrote, “A white guy from New York, who 
hadn’t known Negroes before, said he feels we are no different from his own people.  He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Brother Omar, “To My GI Brothers,” The Black Panther, 4 October 1968. 
 
30 Longley, Grunts, 43-46. 
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feels that a lot of the other white guys are beginning to feel the same way.”32  If basic training 
created for one fleeting moment a sense of racial solidarity, that solidarity slowly melted 
away in the sticky heat of the jungle. 
 In 1965 the African-American soldiers who served in Vietnam expressed a high level 
of pride in their service and conviction that the war would be won quickly.  The common 
experience of training and the ideology of military masculinity lent these men a sense of 
confidence and pride.  In addition, these soldiers had no reason not to trust the competency 
and professionalism of senior officers in MACV.  For these early volunteers, the notion that a 
small, rural backwater would challenge American military might abroad seemed ludicrous.  
Woody Wanamaker an African-American sergeant who served three tours in country during 
the Vietnam War remarked on the unique atmosphere of his first tour.  “At that time [1966], 
the general mood I saw in Vietnam was really up.  There wasn’t any bickering, no “fuck the 
war.”  And there was a lot of—I guess, pride.  Even though troops were dying and I hated to 
see it.  I still had a sense of duty.  I liked the army.  I enjoyed it.”33  By 1968, Wanamaker 
would have a radically different view of military service when young, radical African-
American draftees killed his best friend and severely wounded him in a fragging incident.  
Colin Powell who served his first tour in Vietnam in 1963 as a young captain reported a 
similar atmosphere of optimism despite his misgivings about U.S. strategy.34 
 As the ground war wore on, faulty military strategy led to high casualty rates and 
mutual recrimination as officers and enlisted men vented their frustrations at each other over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 David Parks, GI Diary, (New York: Harper and Row), 1968. 
 
33 Woody Wanamaker, interview by Harry Maurer, in Strange Ground: Americans in Vietnam 1945-1972 An 
Oral History, ed. Harry Maurer, (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 240. 
 
34 Colin Powell, My American Journey , 103. 
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military failures in Vietnam.   General Westmoreland, the commander of MACV, used large, 
division wide patrols of the South Vietnam countryside in order to engage the Viet Cong.35 
However, these large patrols enabled the Viet Cong to easily see the Americans coming and 
then melt into the jungles.  A study done by the U.S. Army in 1967 found that the Viet Cong 
initiated 88% of all engagements.  This statistic was telling: the Viet Cong did not fight 
unless the odds were heavily in their favor.36  In the face of such an elusive enemy, the 
morale of the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps slowly morphed into frustration, fear and 
mutual recrimination. 
 The failures of American military strategy in Vietnam fueled tension between officers 
and enlisted men. War on the ground was usually left in the hands of junior officers who saw 
Vietnam as a chance to prove their prowess in combat and get their ticket stamped for further 
advancement in the ranks. Officers gradually began to rely on body count numbers to 
determine success in the war. Reliance on body count led to inflated numbers and risky, ill 
thought out ventures by junior officers looking for glory.  More importantly, such decisions 
fueled resentment among enlisted men who felt that junior officers expended their lives 
thoughtlessly.37 Harry “Lightbulb” Bryant described the process he and his peers witnessed 
on the ground. “They had a habit of exaggerating a body count,” he recalled, “If we killed 
seven, by the time it would get back to base camp, it would have gotten to twenty-eight.  
Then by the time it got down to Westmoreland’s office in Saigon, it done went up to fifty-
four.  And by the time it left from Saigon going to Washington, it had went up to about one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
165. 
 
36 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 188. 
 
37 Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War, 
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hundred and twenty five.”38 Enlisted soldiers were clearly aware of the failings of military 
policy and they were willing to put the blame on their superior officers. 
 Westmoreland’s miscalculations, which seemed flagrant, rendered military authority 
suspect.39  Into this breach of authority, African-American soldiers found the ability to voice 
concerns over racial discrimination and mistreatment that had largely been silenced when 
morale was high.  African-American soldiers’ most pressing concern over racial 
discrimination was the perception that African Americans shared an unequal burden in 
combat. Nevertheless, soldiers from all races tended to emphasize that racial tensions did not 
exist between soldiers in combat.  After all, bullets did not discriminate and to survive, men 
in combat had to rely on each other.40  However, combat narratives of African-American 
soldiers suggest that the same racial tensions that structured the lives of soldiers in civilian 
society followed them into combat.  Through careful scrutiny of the combat narratives of 
African-American soldiers, racial tensions surrounding the issue of combat become apparent. 
 Many African-American soldiers complained that they were given the most 
dangerous jobs in the combat unit. The position of point man or forward operator was the 
most dangerous position in the platoon because he was the man in front and usually the first 
to be shot at or step into a trap.  Many African-American soldiers noted that the point man 	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39 David Maraniss, They Marched into Sunlight, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 185. 
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was almost always black and they attributed the uneven assignment of minorities to 
discriminatory racial attitudes of officers, who were disproportionately white.41 The strength 
of the perceptions and myths surrounding race in combat can be seen in how Reginald 
“Malik” Edwards remembered his experience walking point.  Like many African-American 
soldiers, he noted that he was almost always assigned to walk point.  However, contrary to 
other African-American soldiers, “Malik” argued that point was the safest position to be in 
combat since he would always be the first person to know what was going on.  While this 
belief was obviously false, Malik’s insistence on his own safety and refusal to acknowledge a 
racial motivation for always being assigned to walk point speaks to the necessity of the belief 
that there were no racial tensions in combat. African-American soldiers like “Malik” had to 
refuse to acknowledge the importance of race in combat because the presence of racial 
tension directly endangered their lives.42 
 However, Racial tensions among American troops in combat can also be seen in the 
narratives of soldiers trying to save their comrades under fire.  Whether or not racial 
hierarchies actually played out in soldiers’ decisions to risk their lives to save one another, 
some African-American soldiers believed it did.  In one example, Marine Rudolph Bridges 
saw a young, black man heroically risk his life to drag a fallen, white comrade out of the 
firing zone and into the cover. However, this touching narrative of interracial bonding in the 
midst of combat loses its luster because the white soldier was screaming, “Put me down 
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nigger” the entire time.43 In this example, it is unclear whether the white soldier meant to 
reinforce notions of black inferiority even while severely injured.   The two soldiers could 
genuinely have been friends, in which case the white soldier’s screaming may have had less 
to do with reinforcing racial modes of behavior than with berating his friend for risking his 
own life by attempting such a foolhardy maneuver.  Irrespective of the relationship between 
the two men, the incident made a real impression on Rudolph Bridges.  Years later, he 
recalled the event as an extreme attempt to enact racial biases even in the midst of a life-
threatening situation.  Bridges’ quick judgment of this situation as an example of racial 
discrimination speaks to a larger concern of some African-Americans that they were 
disadvantaged in combat situations because white soldiers cared less about African-American 
lives than they did about white lives in combat. 
In another narrative, albeit from 1970, some black medics invited a white medic, Jack 
Closkey, to their hootch to smoke marijuana.  Closkey had tried to save the life of one of the 
black medics in the field.  Passing around a joint, the black medics remarked, “This toke’s 
for Doc Allen.  This is because Doc liked you.  He said you were okay for a honky.”44 A 
white medic saving the life of a fellow soldier in a combat situation should have been a 
matter of course.  However the fact that this white medic risked his life to save a black 
soldier must have been seen as out of the ordinary by the African-American medics who 
decided to recognize his bravery.  Combat was not a theater where racial tensions 
disappeared under duress but one where racial tensions were acted out even as the individuals 
involved had to buy into the myth of racial insignificance. 
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 Nevertheless, these narratives also make clear that moments of interracial bonding did 
dramatically alter the racial attitudes of those involved. Combat was the one realm in the 
military where white male hegemony came under clear challenge as all soldiers had to rely 
on each other.  In the heat of battle, the Jim Crow strictures that had bound the lives of both 
black and white soldiers slowly disappeared.  The interracial reliance forged in combat 
created friendships between soldiers who in any other situation would have been enemies. 
For instance, Arthur Gene Woodley came to rely on a fellow soldier from Arkansas who was 
a Klan member, yet the two would never have met or been friends in the civilian world.  
Their reliance on each other in combat forged a friendship that only ended when his friend 
died in his arms.45 
For other African-American soldiers the closeness that soldiers experienced in 
combat broke down the notion of white male superiority and allowed African-American men 
to directly challenge the notions of military masculinity associated with the white male 
soldier. Harry Bryant in particular noted that “I got to find out that white people weren’t as 
tough, weren’t the number one race and all them other perceptions that they tried to ingrain 
in my head.  I found out they got scared like I did.  I found out a lot of them were a lot more 
cowardly than I expected.  I found out some of them were more animalistic than any black 
people I knew.  I found out that they really didn’t have their shit together.”46  It was in 
combat then that established racial and military hierarchies began to break down. 
Combat soldiers’ concerns about racial discrimination slowly trickled back from the 
front lines to base areas in Vietnam and civilian communities at home, providing the basis for 
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African-American anti-war sentiment. African-American soldiers serving on base or near 
major bases, like Da Nang or Long Binh in Saigon used their unique position as purveyors of 
information to meld combat soldiers’ concerns with the radical critiques of civil rights 
leaders at home, giving voice to widespread racial discontent in the military.  A revealing 
example of how news, unsanctioned by the military travelled among enlisted soldiers serving 
in Vietnam can be found in the letters of The Black Panther, a weekly newspaper published 
by the Black Panther Party.  In one letter, a soldier in Saigon asked to be sent multiple copies 
of the newspaper to circulate among his comrades.  The knowledge that this soldier had of 
this paper and his ability to share that knowledge with others speaks to the existence of 
informal, but highly developed networks of communication between African-American 
soldiers.47 
Other African-American soldiers intimated how such networks functioned as 
communities that existed wherever African-American soldiers happened to meet each other.  
For example, David Parks mentioned a transformative moment when he was riding the train 
to Oakland, CA with other African-American soldiers.  Their conversation soon turned to 
racial discrimination in the Army and Parks found that his experiences were almost universal.  
“All the souls here on the train talk about the hell they caught, the nasty details and the 
browbeating.”48  After this discussion with his fellow soldiers, Parks decided that fighting for 
promotion in the Army was not worth it since African-American soldiers would always get 
short shifted by white officers. Active soldiers used these networks to share complaints.  
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Sharing experiences gave men an opportunity to apply their insights to ideologies springing 
out of communities back home.49 
Rumblings of discontent among African-American soldiers in Vietnam that trickled 
back to the civilian world influenced a younger generation of draftees to be wary of military 
service.50 The men coming of draft age in 1966 and 1967 had grown up in the crux of the 
civil rights movement at a time when military service started becoming a less and less 
desirable option for African-American men because of the Vietnam War. Many did not want 
to serve but often felt that they had no choice but to join the service because of the draft.51  A 
good indicator of the changing views of young African-American recruits comes from 
opinion surveys of their views on the draft and military service.  In 1965, a Pentagon survey 
of Army recruits showed that 40 percent of African-American respondents saw military 
service as a primary source to economic betterment.52  However, after 1965, 50 percent of 
surveyed military volunteers cited the draft as their primary reason for joining.53  These 
results suggest military culture was shifting from the initial high morale at the beginning of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 There are many examples from all time periods that show this shift towards racial radicalization because of 
knowledge passed between African-American soldiers.  For just a few examples, see: Ralph C. Thomas III, 
Interview by WGBH, “Interview with Ralph C. Thomas III,” Vietnamizing the War.  Phillip Key, Interview by 
WGBH, “Interview with Phillip Key,” Vietnamizing the War.  Haywood T. Kirkland, Interview by Wallace 
Terry, Bloods, 103. 
 50See	  examples	  like	  “Negro Vets Tells How White Supremacy Marches with American Troops,” Muhammad 
Speaks, 13 May 1966, 5.   	  
51 Sadly, there is inevitability to many oral histories when they talk about going to Vietnam.  Young African-
American men generally knew that without college deferments or physical disabilities, they would be headed to 
Vietnam.  Whites also acknowledged in their interviews that African-Americans and the poor seemed especially 
vulnerable to the draft.  See Robert Kirk, Interview by Mark Beesley, Vietnam: The Heartland Remembers, 98.  
Stanley Goff and Robert Sanders et. al., Brothers: Black Soldiers in the Nam, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 
1982), xvi-2.  James A. Daly and Lee Bergman, A Conscientious Objector’s Vietnam Memoir, (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1975), 3-5. “A Black Muslim,” Baker, Nam, 21. 
 
52 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 125. 
 
53 Flynn, The Draft 1940-1973, 171. 
 
	   	   	  	  
21	  
the Vietnam War towards a slow disillusionment that would make civilian men less likely to 
participate in military service.  In addition reports from the press claimed mass 
discrimination against racial minorities and the poor in the draft. Young, African-American 
men who ended up joining the service felt resentful that their fates had been sealed because 
of their race and educational level.54 
Press accounts of racial discrimination in the draft process reflect real concerns that 
African Americans had with draft boards, committees made up of local worthies who decided 
a draftee’s eligibility for service.  In 1962 less than two hundred draft board members out of 
twelve thousand were African American.  By 1970, African-American representation on 
draft boards had increased to 7 percent but was still well below the national representation of 
African Americans in the population, which was 11 percent.55  In addition, the Selective 
Service Board only gave educational deferments to students making a high grade point 
average or enrolled full time in college.  Since African-American college students were often 
at an educational and economic disadvantage, they were not eligible for educational 
deferments.56 Military historians argue that most Vietnam War veterans were not draftees.  
However, closer scrutiny of the population data suggests that this claim can be misleading. In 
1969, 88 percent of combat casualties were draftees, showing that while the majority of 
soldiers may have been volunteers, the soldiers most likely to be in combat duty were 	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draftees.57 Since African Americans were vulnerable to military service because of their 
economic status and racial identity and because they perceived that they shouldered a 
disproportionate burden of the fighting, the draft process fueled resentment in a new 
generation of recruits schooled in radical civil rights ideology and suspicious of military 
service. 
Perhaps the draft program that caused the most resentment from the radical black 
press and young African-American men was Project 100,000, a program that brought the 
racial vulnerability of African Americans to center stage.58  Project 100,000 was based on the 
report The Negro Family: A Case for National Action, a study created by Assistant Secretary 
of Labor, Daniel P. Moynihan, which argued that the cause of black poverty in America was 
not unemployment but the lack of strong, male role models in nuclear families.  Importantly 
for the military, the Moynihan Report revealed that 50 percent of African-American men 
were ineligible for military service and one of the main reasons was because they did not 
meet military IQ test requirements.59  Moynihan suggested that the recruitment of poor 
African-American men into the military would instill values of middle-class respectability 
and American masculinity in the African-American community.60 The Moynihan Report was 
meant to be a sympathetic portrayal of African-American poverty.  However, in the wake of 
the Watts rebellion, a violent riot in the poor, mainly black Watts district of Los Angeles 
prompted by police brutality, African-American leaders like Benjamin Payton, the director of 	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the Protestant Council of New York City’s Office of Church and Race and others quickly 
interpreted the report as blaming African-Americans for their own poverty instead of 
elucidating the role of the state in perpetuating racial poverty.61  
In 1966, the Johnson Administration seized on the Moynihan Report proposal to 
create Project 100,000, envisioned as a perfect solution to both their manpower demands for 
more draftees and the problem of poverty, especially racial poverty.  By drafting poor, young 
African-American men into the military, the Johnson Administration hoped to minimize the 
impact of the Vietnam War on white middle class voters as well.62  The problem with Project 
100,000 was that Pentagon officials and mid-grade officers heavily resisted the recruitment 
of these poor, young men and dubbed Project 100,000 recruits derisively as the “moron 
corps.” Nearly 60 percent of these recruits ended up on the front lines of the Vietnam War 
and about 60 percent of them were African-American.  For this reason, few of the young men 
garnered job skills from their military experience.63  Although the success of this program for 
the military and for the affected soldiers would be highly contested in the military, most 
officers saw the new recruits as unfit for military service.  In addition, African American 
media outlets interpreted this program as taking advantage of poor men with no recourse to 
escape the draft. 
Ironically, even as the military fought against press reports that African-Americans 
were asked to bear a disproportionate amount of the fighting and dying in Vietnam, programs 
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like Project 100,000 only served to popularize these beliefs within the African-American 
community. Casualty rates for African-American soldiers did drop below their proportion in 
the civilian population between 1968 and 1973.  Nevertheless the popular view of Vietnam 
had been ingrained in the minds of African-American soldiers, and they continued to allege 
that they bore a disproportionate burden in combat throughout the course of the war.64 For 
example, Phillip Key served in Vietnam in 1969, when casualty rates for African-Americans 
had already dropped significantly.  Yet he still believed that African-American soldiers were 
more liable for combat duty as well as other punishments. “A lot of brothers were being 
busted, a lot of brothers that wasn't being promoted, a lot of brothers who were catching the 
shit detail jobs.”65 
 Thanks to Project 100,000 anti-war sentiment among African-American soldiers and 
civilian communities intensified when a draft call was issued to Muhammad Ali, the world’s 
heavy-weight, boxing champion and radical civil rights icon. Although Muhammad Ali 
failed the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) and was declared ineligible for the draft, 
his draft status officially changed to “eligible” on February 16, 1966 with the passage of 
Project 100,000 and he received his draft call.66 The Nation of Islam paper, Muhammad 
Speaks, immediately seized on the popularity of Muhammad Ali to springboard its own 
blistering critique of African-American involvement in the Vietnam War onto the national 
scene.  Ali borrowed on black nationalism’s interpretation of the proper role of African 
Americans to American military service when he asked, “Why should they ask me and other 
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so-called Negroes to put on a uniform and go 10,0000 miles from home and drop bombs on 
brown people in Viet Nam while so-called Negro people in Louisville are treated like dogs 
and denied simple human rights?”67  As the foremost African-American athlete in the United 
States and a paragon of black masculinity, Ali’s refusal to be drafted associated draft protest 
with desirable black masculinity rather than cowardice.  For African-American men already 
disillusioned with the war, Ali provided a voice and credibility to their reluctance not to serve 
in the military.  In addition, his bravery in standing up for his anti-war sentiments despite 
being stripped of his boxing title and license in 1967 and forced into retirement for three 
years inspired other African-American draftees to voice their anti-war sentiments.  Ali’s 
ultimate triumph in the Supreme Court case Clay vs. United States only added to his 
legendary reputation as one of the greatest icons of radical black masculinity.  For young 
African-American recruits influenced by Ali, real masculinity lay not in dying for what they 
perceived to be an imperialist war, but risking jail and permanent separation from family and 
friends by standing up for the principles of racial equality and pride. 
The specter of cowardice surrounding desertion brought added significance to Ali’s 
defiant behavior.  For Terry Whitmore, the Marine deserter, the charge of cowardice was 
especially potent and he took special care to emphasize that it was not cowardice that kept 
him from returning to the war.  According to Whitmore, he had already more than proved his 
own bravery under fire by saving his lieutenant when he himself was injured.  He went on to 
explain that his decision to desert was thus not motivated by cowardice but by anger at the 
Marine Corps.  The Marines had promised him that he would be returning home after his 
ordeal but then changed his orders to return to Vietnam and not to the unit that he had 	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originally served with, which was decimated.68  For Whitmore, Ali’s protest provided an 
alternative model of masculinity that painted his own actions as bravery for finally standing 
against an unjust war and accepting permanent exile from America.   
For Air Force recruit, Bruce Reavis, Ali’s refusal to enter military service cast his 
own decision to join the Air Force as unmanly.  Reavis’ introduction to military service was 
familiar to many young African-American men who served.  While he had won a football 
scholarship to Rutgers University, he was unprepared for college courses and ended up 
dropping out after his freshman year.  Realizing that he could not avoid the draft, Reavis pre-
empted the military by deciding to join the Air Force.  Reflecting on his military service, 
Reavis expressed regret that he did not choose to fight the draft like his hero, Muhammad 
Ali.  Although he realized intellectually that he did not have Ali’s significant economic and 
political resources to fight the draft, he considered his decision to join the Air Force as a 
betrayal of his own masculinity.  Revealingly, Reavis remarked, “I’m not proud of my 
military service.  If I were a man, I’d have gone to prison like Ali.”69  Ali’s draft resistance 
against Project 100,000 quickly became a media flashpoint that served to popularize a radical 
re-interpretation of African-American soldiers’ relation to the military during the Vietnam 
War. Ali flipped black masculine expectation on its head through his actions by suggesting 
that draft avoidance was an act of masculine bravery while bowing to the draft was an act of 
cowardice for young men.70 
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By 1968, conditions were ripe for racial conflict to unfold in the United States 
military.  An earlier, older generation of proud African-American veterans had been worn 
down, disillusioned, and killed by the first brutal years of the war.  In their place, a younger 
generation of African-American draftees more willing to question authority and conditioned 
by the radical civil rights movement and the black press to be suspicious of military authority 
came into the service.  Although the military tried to redress racial ills and act more 
sensitively to civil rights in the later years of the war, the image of the military as a white, 
patriarchal organization that exploited poor, young black men had been set in the minds of 
young recruits.  This younger generation of African-American soldiers was disillusioned by 
the traditional military masculinity espoused by the older generation of volunteers.  They 
would find in radical black masculinity, represented by groups like the Black Panthers, a 
racial identity that spoke to their particular concerns about race, government, and military 
service. 
Section II: The Storm Breaks 1968-1972 
The rise of radical black masculinity was only a small part of a larger movement of 
general unrest and discontent in the military spurred by the Tet Offensive of 1968.  A strong 
anti-draft movement in the United States supported anti-war organizing among Vietnam War 
soldiers and veterans.  Between 1968 and 1973, a number of anti-war groups, operating 
locally at different military bases, provided a strong, military voice against the war.71  
However, rather than participating in general discontent, black discontent took a radically 
different path and African-American soldiers often clashed with white soldiers.  African-
American soldiers perceived their concerns with military service to be different from the 	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concerns of white soldiers because they believed that they bore a disproportionate burden in 
combat and in the draft.72  In addition, the radical civil rights movement provided an 
alternative subtext that questioned the very belonging of African-Americans to the American 
state, setting African-American soldiers at odds with both the military and white soldiers.  In 
the later years of the war, tensions between white and African-American soldiers would 
escalate into rioting as well as numerous incidents of interracial violence that had remained 
largely under the surface during the early years.73  Ultimately, the rise of radical black 
masculinity would not only drive a wedge between African-American soldiers and other 
soldiers, but also challenge the very construction of military masculinity itself.   
The first turning point of the Vietnam War was the Tet Offensive, a surprise offensive 
by the North Vietnamese.74  In purely military terms, the Tet Offensive turned out to be a 
complete disaster for the National Liberation Front and its North Vietnamese allies.75  
However, the ability of the North Vietnamese to launch the counteroffensive despite claims 
by Johnson that they were close to defeat proved to be the death knell for the Johnson 
Administration and Westmoreland’s command of the war.  General Creighton Abrams would 
replace Westmoreland as Commander of MACV on April 10, 1968 and Richard M. Nixon 
would take the oath of office on January 10, 1969.76  For the next five years (1968-1973), the 
U.S. would be involved in a long, slow withdrawal of troops even as MACV tried 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Graham, The Brothers’ Vietnam War, 145. 
 
73 Longley, Grunts, 129-130. 
 
74 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 115. 
 
75 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 123. 
 
76 Sorley, A Better War, 18.  Also, Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 138. 
 
	   	   	  	  
29	  
increasingly desperate efforts to preserve a stable and independent South Vietnamese state.77 
For soldiers already frustrated by the lack of U.S. success, the latter half of the war offered 
more of the same strategies even as the U.S. lost the will to fight and instead began to 
negotiate seriously with the North Vietnamese for an early settlement to the war.  The 
soldiers who fought the Vietnam War felt increasingly neglected by both the military and the 
government, leading to mass indiscipline among the ranks.78  
The soldiers who bore the brunt of the fighting in the latter half of the war were more 
likely to be draftees.  This was partly because volunteers and those professional soldiers who 
already served in Vietnam were more likely to get stateside service.  In addition, senior non-
commissioned officers who did serve in Vietnam could use their seniority to get out of 
combat duty and remain on the relatively secure military bases.79  In the absence of 
volunteers and professional soldiers, draftees began to shoulder a disproportionate amount of 
combat duty.80 In oral histories, African-American and white drafted soldiers highlight the 
pervasive lack of enthusiasm for the war on the ground.  Many expressed a sense of 	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trepidation, dread, or anger at the racial and socio-economic injustice of the draft.81  Stan 
Goff, an African-American soldier who was drafted in January of 1968 along with his friend 
Bob Sanders, explained the hopelessness of the draft situation for those who were lower class 
or black.  “If you had a B average, or your father was wealthy, or maybe you knew a 
congressman, then maybe you could get out of it,” he claimed.  “I know there were 
bureaucratic loopholes, but I couldn’t get in on any of them.  So I got my draft greetings.  I 
just succumbed.  What could I do?”82  Even more poignantly, Robert Kirk who reported to 
his draft board in 1969 decided to appeal his draft call.  “I’ll never forget standing before 
those old men.  They didn’t say one word to me as I presented my case.  Not one word.”  
Afterwards he was ushered out of the room where he saw an office lady tell an eighteen-year-
old African-American man who couldn’t read or write to “Just put your mark right here.”  
For Kirk, the experience of seeing an illiterate, African-American man being sent to Vietnam 
confirmed his suspicions that as an able bodied man, he would have no chance to avoid the 
draft.83 
Unwillingness to serve in Vietnam extended from the enlisted men to the officer 
corps.  Many of the younger officers entered the service with the skeptical mindset of young 
college students involved in the anti-war movement.  Charles A. Noon, a white officer who 
served in the Army from January of 1968 to January of 1970, joined ROTC in college 
because of familial pressure.  After fulfilling his military obligations, Noon became an anti-	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war activist.84  Another young, white officer to express his doubts about the war was the 
grandson of World War II general S.L.A. Marshall.  John Marshall risked complete 
estrangement from his family when he obtained conscientious objector status.  In a letter to 
his grandson, S.L.A. Marshall voiced strong disappointment, “That the Army seemingly 
prefers to give you an honorable separation means nothing to this part of what was once your 
family…We know why you quit.  It wasn’t conscience.  You simply chickened out.  You 
didn’t have the guts to take it…No male among us has ever been like that and the women, 
too, thank heaven, are stronger.  That means you don’t belong.85 In families with deep ties to 
military service, the Vietnam War strained bonds between an older generation of men who 
served and a younger generation of men beginning to doubt the morality of the war. 
By the beginning of 1968, a manpower crisis had taken shape: enlisted soldiers and 
officers had lost faith in the military’s strategy in Vietnam.  In addition, the popular anti-war 
movement in civilian society exacerbated the military’s manpower problem by planting fear 
and consternation in the minds of draftees who were unwilling to risk their lives for a war 
that the military seemed to be losing.  This crisis extended from the Army to the Marine 
Corps and other branches of military service as well.86 For African-American soldiers in 
particular, the breakdown of Army order by 1968 created a vacuum where alternative 
understandings of masculinity resonated and gained added significance.  Two events 
influenced by the radical civil rights movement in particular, unleashed critiques of the 
Vietnam War that many African-American soldiers already harbored inside. 
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In April 1968, barely two and a half months after the start of the Tet Offensive, 
Richard J. Ford III was listening to Radio Free Hanoi while resting in the jungle during a 
search-and-destroy patrol.  Ford and other African-American soldiers had listened to Radio 
Free Hanoi primarily for the soul music that the North Vietnamese government broadcasted.  
They rarely listened to Hanoi’s political critiques of the war because they viewed the station 
as a mouthpiece of North Vietnamese propoganda.  However, on this day, Hanoi Hannah, the 
English-speaking radio broadcaster of the North Vietnamese regime had earth-shattering 
news for African-American soldiers listening to the program.  Famed civil rights leader 
Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee.  As Ford listened in 
shock to the news, Hanoi Hannah entreated her audience, “Soul brothers, go home.  Whitey 
raping your mothers and your daughters, burning down your homes.  What you over here 
for?  This is not your war.”  As Ford struggled to hold in the tears, he wondered for the first 
time if Hanoi Hannah was right.  “I really thought—I really started believing it, because it 
was too many blacks than there should be in infantry.”87 
 Although Martin Luther King Jr. was heavily criticized in the last years of his life for 
being at times both too radical (in his opposition to the Vietnam War) and too conservative 
(in his refusal to move away from non-violence), he remained a gigantic figure in the civil 
rights movement.88 King always stood in the middle between the more conservative and 
more radical elements.  His decision to speak out against the Vietnam War in May of 1967 
shows just how radical the civil rights movement had become.  Always good at gauging 	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public sentiment, King decided to come out against the war even as more conservative civil 
rights organizations derided him.  However, the reaction of NAACP members to Roy 
Wilkins’ denunciation of King suggested that African Americans were more united against 
the war than previously thought.  Out of some two hundred letters that the NAACP received 
about King’s decision to come out against the war, over 90 percent denounced the NAACP 
for failing to support King.  Many of the letters contained returned NAACP membership 
cards.89 If King’s decision to support the war is indicative of a larger trend towards anti-war 
sentiment among African Americans, his assassination succeeded in uniting African 
Americans against the war.90  Black communities interpreted his assassination as the ultimate 
betrayal by the American state, which had failed to protect Dr. King or enact enough civil 
rights change.  In the aftermath of his death, one hundred and twenty American cities 
experienced racial riots.91 
African-American soldiers were already aware of King’s opposition to the Vietnam 
War and in the aftermath of his assassination, increasing numbers began to seriously consider 
the reasons given by the radical civil rights movement for why they should not be involved in 
an American war overseas.92  In Ford’s narrative, it is the King assassination that finally 
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pushes him to question the Army’s role in Vietnam.93  Similarly, in Terry Whitmore’s 
narrative, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and his experience of the black 
subculture in Tokyo’s soul bars served as a similar catalyst in his transformation from loyal 
Marine to politically conscious war deserter.  During his interview with an organization that 
helped deserters gain political asylum overseas, the King assassination provided him with 
justification for his decision. Thus the King assassination became a moment where African-
American soldiers revisited and legitimized pre-existing critiques of the Vietnam War.94 
As African Americans in urban communities responded to the assassination with 
violence, some soldiers feared that they would be used for riot duty.  The prospect was not 
unreasonable because some African-American soldiers had already been used for riot control 
during the Long Hot Summer of 1967 when the media reported almost daily incidents of 
racial violence and rioting in urban areas.95  In addition, the use of the 82nd Airborne 
Division, a mainly black division to quell rioting in Detroit in the same summer, awakened 
civilian societies and soldiers to the possibility of conflicted loyalties in riot control duty.96  
Nevertheless the scope of racial rioting after the Martin Luther King assassination and the 
heavier use of Army and Marine regulars on riot duty in 1968 forced African-American 
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soldiers who were reluctant to choose between loyalty to the military or racial loyalty into a 
moment of public reckoning.97 
At Fort Hood, Texas the refusal of the so-called Fort Hood G.I.s to participate in riot 
duty in Chicago in the aftermath of the assassination brought national media attention and 
forced African-American soldiers for the first time to see their racial loyalty and military 
loyalty in direct and violent conflict.  African-American soldiers at Fort Hood, many of 
whom were veterans of the Vietnam War, harbored deep concerns about their role in the 
military.  They gathered at a parade ground on base to voice their concerns. After 
negotiations with several junior officers, they met with the commander of the division, Major 
General John K. Boles Jr., who told them they could remain on the parade ground while he 
decided whether or not these G.I.s had the right to refuse riot duty.  However, MP Lieutenant 
Colonel Edwin Kulo, unfamiliar with the circumstances, ordered them to disperse before 
hearing from the commander.  Unwilling to budge, forty-three soldiers were ultimately 
arrested by military police.98  Perhaps bowing to public pressure and scrutiny, almost all of 
the Fort Hood G.I.s were given light sentences ranging from six months confinement, loss of 
$63 from one month’s pay, to being demoted to the lowest rank.99  Nevertheless, these 
instances forced African-American soldiers who were already harboring concerns about their 
relationship with military service to voice their critiques publicly.   
Testimony from the Fort Hood G.I.s and many other African-American soldiers 
involved in similar but not as high profile protest to the King assassination gave insight into 	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how African-American soldiers resisted the prospect of having to choose between military 
loyalty and racial loyalty. According to the NAACP attorney for the soldiers at Fort Hood, 
many of them reported that if the soldier “complains to[o] often or to[o] loudly, he finds 
himself with a lot of extra duty in his company.  He might get himself into a lot of difficulty 
by being branded a ‘troublemaker.’  For a career soldier this is a dangerous thing.  He doesn’t 
want to make waves unnecessarily if he is depending on it for his livelihood.”100 These 
soldiers largely did not identity themselves as radical when they entered the military.  While 
many were drafted soldiers, they wanted to simply serve their time peacefully. However, the 
specter of riot duty pushed these soldiers to choose between loyalty to the military or to their 
racial community. In addition, the larger institutional structure of the military discouraged 
African American soldiers from voicing their concerns about race and riot duty.  When they 
did voice their concerns, these African American soldiers were then typecast as hopeless 
radicals and troublemakers. 
Similarly, Haywood T. Kirkland’s unit was sent to Chicago as a riot squadron during 
the Democratic National Convention.  When Kirkland protested, his captain pushed the issue, 
“Kirkland, you going to Chicago if I have to carry you myself.”  Partly because of this 
experience, Kirkland decided he had to get out of the Army as soon as possible. He became a 
troublemaker and ultimately convinced his officers that it was more convenient to honorably 
discharge him earlier than to continue to put up with his antics.  Upon release from the Army, 
Kirkland became involved in a black nationalist organization in Washington, D.C.101  
Kirkland perceived the Army’s role in riot duty as a declaration of war against civilian 
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African-American communities.  Unable to reconcile his own loyalty to his race with an 
already tenuous relationship to military service, Kirkland felt forced into open opposition to 
the military. 
Finally, Malik Edwards, who had already left the Army by the time of the King 
assassination, pointed to the event to assert his belief that African-Americans were already 
fighting an internal war with whites.  This prospect of racial war made it easier for him to 
accept the possibility of death when he joined the Black Panther Party. “For me the thought 
of being killed in the Black Panther Party by the police and the thought of being killed by 
Vietnamese was just a qualitative differences.  I had left one war and came back and got into 
another one.”102  According to Malik, other Vietnam veterans in the Panthers felt similarly. 
For Vietnam veterans like Malik and Kirkland, military loyalty had not only been replaced 
by racial loyalty but their new loyalty meant direct antagonism towards the state. 
If the King assassination loosened already strained bonds of loyalty between the 
military and African-American soldiers, the model of radical black masculinity provided by 
militant civil rights symbols like the Black Panthers would shape how African-American 
soldiers expressed their resistance in the military as it developed in 1968 and 1969.103  
Wearing their black leather boots, jackets, and berets and carrying guns, radical black power 
groups like the Black Panthers sent a powerful message about black masculinity.  Gaining 
prominence in 1967 and early 1968, the Black Panther Party made it clear that they would no 
longer accept police brutality and that they would fight violence with violence. The Panthers 
celebrated the image of martial masculinity and violence by positing the police as an 
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external, conquering Army and themselves as freedom fighters.104 As Bobby Seale would 
later recount in admiration, Huey Newton, the founder of the Black Panther Party, was the 
“baddest motherfucker to ever set foot in history.”105 
The Panthers’ critique of the police as an occupying Army put them in direct 
opposition to African-American involvement in military service and provided a masculine 
alternative for African-American veterans disillusioned with the Vietnam War but still 
holding on their identity as masculine warriors.106  Although the percentage of African-
American soldiers who joined the Black Panthers was miniscule compared to the larger 
population of African-American soldiers, they made up a large number of the Panthers.  Both 
Seale and Newton later remarked that Vietnam veterans who joined the Panthers played a 
vital role in teaching members to handle guns and other weapons.  Radicalized by their 
military experience, veterans like Malik Edwards and Haywood T. Kirkland joined black 
nationalist or black power groups afterwards.  Radical civil rights groups, like the Black 
Panthers, gave shape and form to amorphous black, anti-war sentiment by providing a clear, 
masculine alternative to military masculinity, thus forming the basis for a new understanding 
of radical black masculinity. 
Despite rumblings of protest among African-American soldiers, the military and 
MACV were still largely unaware of the growing racial discontent in its ranks in early 1968. 
The military was preoccupied with more pressing disasters, such as the Tet Offensive and 
growing discontent among white soldiers and anti-war protestors at home.  In the tense social 
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atmosphere of early 1968, African-American discontent remained a largely ignored, although 
potent problem.  In April of 1968, Army General Abrams remarked to the press that despite 
large-scale protests among soldiers against the war, the service of African-Americans 
remained a bright spot in the Army record.  The general remarked, “Racial problems among 
our men in North Vietnam are for all practical purposes, insignificant.”  This illusion of 
African-American soldiers’ unquestioned loyalty would soon be shattered by the outbreak of 
widespread racial rioting and violence in Vietnam.107 
On August 29, 1968, the balmy Saigon night awakened with gunfire, shouts, and 
rioting as a small number of prisoners started to fight with each other in the largest military 
prison in Vietnam.  Long Binh Jail, colloquially known as “LBJ,” erupted in violence as 
rioting prisoners numbering in the several hundreds overpowered the guards, the stockade 
commander, and set fire to a number of buildings, including the administration building that 
contained the prison records.108  The rioters were almost all African-Americans and reports 
quickly circulated that these black rioters were beating and harassing white prisoners within 
the jail.  Military police [MPs] soon arrived at the compound and managed to retake most of 
the prison area using tear gas and fixed bayonets.  However, over two hundred African-
American prisoners held out against the military police in a sector known as “Big Red” in the 
northern part of the Long Binh compound.  These prisoners soon made makeshift tribal robes 
out of Army blankets and adopted other black nationalist garb.  The military police cordoned 
off “Big Red” and decided to starve out the prisoners.  After one month, only fifteen 
prisoners remained in “Big Red.”  At this point, the military police finally decided to act and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Message, Abrams to Lieutenant General Palmer et al., MAC 04599, 0608347 April 1968, Abrams Papers, 
Back Channel Files; Jack White, “Angry Black Soldiers,” The Progressive, March 1970, 22. 
 
108 Ronald H. Spector,  After Tet:  The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,  (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 242. 
 
	   	   	  	  
40	  
a squad armed with bayonets and tear gas managed to subdue the rest of the rioters.  One 
prisoner died in the riot, twenty-six other prisoners were injured, and eight guards, including 
the commander of the jail, were hospitalized.109   
Immediately after the prison riot, Army officials scrambled to minimize its 
importance to the national media.  Significantly, the riot was not reported in the Washington 
Post until late September 29, 1968, almost a full month after the incident. The news report 
quoted officers who emphasized that the Long Binh jail riot was an isolated incident.  “These 
guys in there have already struck out in the Army.  One way or another, they’ve failed with 
their own unit.  That’s why they’re here.110 
The sheer size and scale of the riot suggests much more widespread discontent among 
African-American soldiers than the Army was willing to admit.  In addition, the Long Binh 
Jail riot was not an isolated incident.  Earlier in June of 1968, black Marines in a stockade in 
Da Nang had mounted a similar prison riot.111  Moreover, by the summer of 1968, African 
Americans formed 60 percent of the prison population at Long Binh stockade and over 40 
percent at the III MAF brigade, the two largest U.S. military prisons in Vietnam.  Many of 
these prisoners were guilty of petty crimes that should have been handled at the company 
level rather than at the stockade, including drug use, insubordination to officers, and public 
drunkenness.  In the aftermath of the prison riot, Army officials at Long Binh struggled to 
separate true criminals from those who were there on petty charges.112 
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After 1968, all branches of military service began to experience racial rioting on 
bases.  Although I have found no comprehensive list of riots or way to effectively measure 
the scope of racial violence, some of the more famous riots include the U.S.S. Kittyhawk riot 
in the Navy in 1972, the Da Nang riot in the Marines in 1968, and the Frankfurt riot in the 
Army 1971.113  The evidence suggests that new militant understandings of black masculinity 
born out of black soldiers’ experiences affected the military as a whole.  In addition, a few 
C.I.A. reports from 1967 and 1970 reveal tantalizing glimpses of the extent of racial violence 
in the military.  According to one report in 1970, the Army in Vietnam experienced a total of 
340 incidents of racial violence involving African-Americans and whites from January to 
November of 1970.114  Considering that many incidents of racial violence probably went 
unreported, the number suggests a serious and widespread problem. 
Even as racial violence garnered the most publicity, the most common expressions of 
militant black masculinity took more subtle forms that provided the basis for a flourishing 
counterculture of dissent.  Many African-American soldiers were limited in the forms 
discontent they could show and military officials ruthlessly quashed any overt political 
activity like anti-war organizing.115 In addition, many soldiers were still beholden to military 
pay and could not afford a bad conduct discharge.  These soldiers could not participate in 
overt resistance activities even if they were sympathetic to the radical civil rights movement.  	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These soldiers expressed their discontent through styles of dress, socialization, and behavior 
in their treatment of each other and white soldiers. Many African-American soldiers used the 
black power salute and/or the “dap,” a highly elaborate handshake between soldiers that 
could last up to several minutes at a time. “Dap” was a sign of solidarity and bonding among 
African-American men.  Dap may have had its origins in African-American culture in 
Vietnam.  One soldier claimed that the term came from the Vietnamese word for beautiful.116 
African-American soldiers also began to adopt black nationalist ideology and ways of 
dress such as tribal dashikis.  During the Long Binh Jail riot, the two hundred African-
American soldiers who took over the “Big Red” sector of the stockade wore dashikis, which 
were a symbol of black nationalism and the “black is beautiful” movement.117  In 1970, 
Henry Rollins, an African-American soldier who became de-facto leader of Long Binh Army 
base was famous for wearing his hair in an afro and tribal dress.  When a white sergeant 
major tried to courts martial him, he received a verdict of “innocent” by a jury of peers, all of 
them African-American and sporting afros as well.118 Although these forms of rebellion may 
seem to be minor and even petty, they were often the only ways African-American soldiers 
could express their discontent. Their ability to control aspects of their life like fashion and 
engage in little moments of dissent became powerful symbols of their independence from 
military masculinity.  In addition, the mass participation of African-American soldiers in this 
counterculture limited the ability of the Army to respond. 	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At times, the practice of “dap” could even lead to racial violence. In one racial 
incident involving the dap, Wilton Persons, an Army officer described an incident at a mess 
hall where a group of African-American soldiers dapped at the same three tables. One day, a 
group of white soldiers, who were tired of seeing this extravagant display of black solidarity 
every day, decided to take over those same tables used by the soldiers and imitate them by 
dapping as well.  The African-American soldiers reacted angrily and started a fight.119  
Wayne Smith, an African-American soldier who served in Vietnam from 1969 to 1970 
commented on the impressions the dap must have made on the white soldiers, “It [the dap] 
must have seemed like some kind of secret society, like we’ve got our own “Skull and 
Bones” society or our own Masons, and that could provoke anger.  But I also think some 
white brothers may have been envious of our willingness to show affection.”120  Within the 
larger sphere of discontent among all soldiers during the Vietnam War, African-American 
soldiers and white soldiers fought against each other even as they resisted a common enemy 
in the military bureaucracy. 
As African-American soldiers created their own understanding of masculinity and 
came into conflict with white soldiers, they created separate, racially distinct spaces on bases 
and in major cities in Vietnam.  While segregation was not a new phenomenon in American 
military service, the context for this segregation was one of personal choice.  Rather than 
being forced into racial segregation, many African-American soldiers chose to live together 
or associate mainly or only with African-American soldiers. For white soldiers, this self-
segregation by African-American soldiers was seen as both threatening and desirable, which 
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only increased racial tensions.  For African-American soldiers, self-segregation promoted 
racial solidarity and pride and gave these soldiers a power and agency in numbers, which 
played into the growing tide of radical black masculinity. 
For example, Long Binh military base remained a hot spot of racial tension with over 
seventy-nine incidents of racial violence in 1969.121  One white soldier who was posted to 
Long Binh in late 1969, noted that the base was ruled by a black sergeant wearing tribal 
dress.  Another white soldier marveled at the sign that hung over the gates to the base made 
up of dog tags that declared “Revolution.”  That African-Americans were able to hang such a 
sign in one of the largest U.S. Army bases speaks to the extent of racial dissent in the 
Army.122  This incident, as well as other incidents at Long Binh including the prison riot and 
Henry Rollins’ courts martial, made the base a hot spot for racial activity.  By pooling their 
resources and sticking together in an act of racial solidarity, these African-American soldiers 
gained a level of protection.   
Even subtle forms of discontent generated a spiral of actions and reactions that 
intensified racial violence.  Mutual hostility between African-American soldiers and white 
soldiers only encouraged more racial segregation.  For instance, in Saigon, the African-
American entertainment district was in Cholon and at Soul Alley, while whites patronized 
bars on Tu Do Street.  Whites and African-Americans did not patronize the same 
establishments and those who broke the strict rules of segregation could be prey to racial 
violence.123 James Calbreath found himself in for a shock on his first introduction to race 	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relations in Vietnam.  “The first real casualty I ever saw was a young black man who came in 
on a stretcher and he was hanging his head over the end of the stretcher and it was because he 
didn’t have a jaw.”  Apparently, the young man had been drinking in a bar with some friends 
when a white soldier flung a fragmentation grenade at them.124 
Radical black masculinity was not the only possibility for African Americans.  Many 
officers like Joseph B. Anderson, Colin Powell, and Archie “Joe” Biggers remained 
dedicated to a traditional understanding of military service even as younger African-
American soldiers resisted.125  These soldiers maintained the values that had brought them 
into the Army professionally and often found themselves on the opposite side of a growing 
gulf among African-American soldiers.  Anderson for instance pointed out that there were 
few opportunities for him in private industry.  “As a graduate of West Point, I was an officer 
and a gentleman by act of Congress.  Where else could a black go and get that label just like 
that?126 
Other, older African-American soldiers who sympathized with younger, radical 
draftees would find the cultural, generation gap impossible to reconcile. Sergeant Woody 
Wanamaker felt initially sympathetic to racial discontent in the Army after King’s 
assassination.  However, other African-American soldiers in his platoon saw him as a racial 	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traitor for his attempts to work within the military institution to create interracial dialogue.  
These soldiers threw a grenade into his hootch, killing his best friend, another black sergeant, 
and wounding him severely.  Whatever empathy Wanamaker had with the militant African-
American soldiers soon disappeared in his own anger, guilt, and grief over what had 
happened.  After his disastrous tour of duty in 1968, he continued to request assignment to 
Vietnam in hopes of rooting out those who had killed his friend and almost killed him.127  
Similarly, in 1968, Colin Powell, now a major, had to move his cot every night for fear of 
coming under attack by his own men.128  These older African-American soldiers found that 
even if they sympathized with the younger generation, their authority rendered them suspect. 
After 1968, radical attitudes of black masculinity became widespread in the military.  
However, radical black masculinity was not a monolithic force that drew all African-
American soldiers to its sway.  Older African-American soldiers, especially career enlisted 
and professional officers who had survived from the earlier half of the war largely remained 
loyal to the military as an organization. Nevertheless, radical attitudes dominated among 
drafted soldiers in the later half of the war for a myriad of different reasons.  Tensions 
surrounding African-American soldiers’ participation in combat and the draft from the early 
years of the war coupled with the rise of new ideas about black pride from the radical civil 
rights movement and increasing violence between blacks and whites all combined to create a 
racial crisis that would last even past the end of the Vietnam War.  Radical black masculinity 
was especially dangerous because it critiqued the state and by proxy the military as the 
natural enemies of African Americans.  In this formulation, only resistance to military 
service was acceptable for any young African American worthy of his own masculinity.  	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Towards the end of the war, the Pentagon would use this antagonism towards the state to 
attempt to eliminate black radical masculinity.  However, by challenging the very desirability 
of military service, African-American soldiers changed the very formulation of black military 
service as a path towards manhood and citizenship.  Moving forward from the Vietnam War, 
the military would have to find new ways to relate to African Americans. 
Epilogue: A New Deal  (1971-1973) 
At the heart of the Vietnam experience is a powerful account of how a strong 
institutional culture can be successfully challenged and changed by a combination of flawed 
military strategy, a strong grassroots movement, and widespread racial discontent. One of the 
main assumptions of radical black masculinity was the belief that the state, and by proxy the 
military, were internal colonizers of African-Americans.129  Rather than using the military to 
secure citizenship and middle-class respectability as promised by military masculinity, 
growing numbers of African-American soldiers began to question the desirability of these 
values.130  African-American men had been disenfranchised not because they were lazy, or 
pathologically criminal, or unable to achieve the white, middle-class ideal of the nuclear 
family, as suggested by government documents like the Moynihan Report, but because they 
had been systematically disenfranchised and economically oppressed by the state and Jim 
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Crow.131  For African Americans influenced by the radical civil rights movement, military 
service meant accepting an impossible bargain that would not only hold African-American 
soldiers under the direct control of the institution that had oppressed them, but also forced 
them to recognize their own supposed pathology as men too flawed to achieve the dominant, 
masculine ideal of the middle-class, male breadwinner household. 
In order to contain the growing irrelevance of traditional military masculinity, the 
Army had to change its own understanding of African-American soldiers to fit the new 
sensibilities of soldiers shaped by the civil rights movement.  These changes in the 
relationship between African-American soldiers and military service converged on the All-
Volunteer Force as a panacea for all of the military’s social problems.132  By instituting an 
All-Volunteer Force and getting rid of the draft, the Nixon Administration and the Pentagon 
hoped to quash the possibility civilian and military dissent.  Since African-American men 
who subscribed to radical black masculinity were directly antagonistic to the military 
establishment, Army officials hoped that by ending the draft, African Americans with radical 
tendencies would no longer join the Army.133 Ironically, it was the Army’s and Marine 
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Corps’ own reliance on drafted soldiers in combat positions that brought this radical 
understanding of black masculinity into the military. 
 Nevertheless, the Army could not hope to rely solely on the All-Volunteer Force to 
eradicate discontent. One of the lasting achievements of the radical civil rights movement 
was to question the value of citizenship, assimilation, and respectability.  By the early 1970s, 
many African-Americans had come to reject the idea that military service would rescue 
African Americans from their own pathological poverty and grant them citizenship and 
middle-class respectability.  African Americans after the civil rights movement no longer 
saw the military as an oasis from the civilian world because the civil rights movement had 
succeeded in bringing down Jim Crow in the South.  The African-American community 
came to accept the critique of military service offered by radical black masculinity even if it 
did not accept the tenets of radical black masculinity itself.  In response, the military had to 
find a new way of attracting potential African-American men that would sell the benefits of 
the Army in radically different terms.134 
Starting in 1972, the Army launched a new advertising campaign to recruit soldiers 
for the All-Volunteer Force.  Teaming up with the advertising agency, Ayer & Son, the Army 
poured millions into advertising, buying up prime time television advertising spots and 
enlisting African-American media outlets.135  The new, re-vamped Army advertisements 
marketed the slogan “The Army Wants to Join You” as a radical re-envisioning of the 
meaning of military service.  Rather than portray military service as a duty to one’s country, 
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the new advertising strategy emphasized the material benefits for soldiers in the Army.  In 
1971, the military service branches ran a total of eleven advertisements in Ebony magazine, 
barely one advertisement per issue.136  By 1972, they ran a total of thirty-four advertisements, 
indicating a renewed market push capture the hopes and aspirations of young, career-oriented 
African Americans.  Of these thirty-four advertisements, ten were directed towards college-
bound or college-educated African Americans potentially interested in the officer corps.  
These advertisements included such messages as, “Save your family $11,280.  The cost of an 
average college education” or “Thinking about a career?  Think about two” for the Army 
reserve.137  One advertisement for the Judge Adjutant General (JAG) ran, “When you join the 
world’s biggest law firm, you’ll get a case load.  Not a back room.”138 
 The Army was looking for a new type of black man who expressed pride in his racial 
identity, but was ultimately a professional, career-oriented man who cared deeply about 
individual success. These ideal soldiers should still express a military masculinity that valued 
patriotism and service to one’s country.  Yet the main benefit of military service was not 
citizenship or racial uplift, but individual social and economic mobility.  The Army adopted 
the language and attitudes of the private sector by emphasizing military service not as a duty, 
but as a professional career.  In addition, a raise in the pay of newly recruited privates from 
$288 a month to $307.23 a month helped to make the Army a competitive choice to the 
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private sector.139  The Army hoped that through recruitment, they could spur a new 
demographic shift  
Ultimately, the prescription for radical black masculinity was to offer African-
American soldiers a “new deal” by adopting some of the social and economic critiques of 
radical black masculinity while rejecting its blatant antagonism towards the Army.  The 
Army did not offer citizenship or respectability because these were goals already achieved by 
the Civil Rights movement.  However, by selling social mobility, the Army attempted to 
move past the blame placed at its doorstep for discrimination against African Americans and 
emphasize a new, brighter future not based on the improvement of a supposedly flawed race, 
but by offering opportunity to individual, hardworking African-American men.  Through the 
All-Volunteer Force, the Army adopted a new military masculinity forged in the experiences 
of widespread general and racial discontent among the troops during the Vietnam War. 
Even as the Army moved forward into the All-Volunteer Force, radical black 
masculinity and the soldiers who created it must not be forgotten.  Yet serious questions still 
remain to be answered about the fate of these radical soldiers.  Did racial dissent persist 
within the All-Volunteer Force despite the efforts of the Army?  If so, how did the 
experiences of these later soldiers differ from the experiences of Vietnam-era soldiers?  How 
did the Army react to continued discontent?  What is the enduring legacy of radical black 
masculinity for race relations in the Army today?  These questions, along with the rise and 
development of radical black masculinity during the Vietnam War, represent crucial paths for 
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further research as scholars seek to understand the long and tangled history of race, gender, 
and war in the United States. 
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